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  1 
Abstract  
We use an extended partial equilibrium trade model to derive optimal environmental policy responses 
to tariff reduction requirements and assess the impact of such policies on the welfare of trading 
partners. We find that countries which attribute preferential political weights to farmers’ welfare have 
an incentive to implement environmental policies that deviate from the Pigouvian solution – even if 
production is not de facto linked to environmental externalities. We clarify the conditions under which 
trading partners do not gain from unilateral trade liberalisation if trade concessions are accompanied 
by strategic environmental policy changes. We postulate a role for the WTO in overseeing the process 
of domestic policy formulation.  
 
Key words: trade liberalisation, strategic environmental policy, multifunctionality, agri-environmental 
policy, WTO   
 
JEL classifications: D60, F11, F18, Q17  
 
 
1. Introduction  
Trade liberalisation and environmental protection have become predominant issues affecting world 
agriculture at the beginning of this century. While the main goal of freer trade is to enhance 
international specialization, some countries are concerned that trade liberalisation may conflict with 
non-trade policy objectives and thereby reduce social welfare. Such non-trade objectives include, 
among others, environmental protection and landscape preservation, food security, rural development 
or animal welfare. Some OECD countries argue that their agricultural sectors need to be supported in 
order to ensure the continuing delivery of environmental amenities (Latacz-Lohmann and Hodge, 
2001; Potter and Burney, 2002). Other countries have expressed concern that environmental policies 
might be used as a substitute for conventional border protection without genuinely pursuing 
environmental goals (Vasavada and Warmerdam, 1998; Freeman and Roberts, 1999; Blandford et al., 
2003).  
The appropriateness of domestic policies targeting non-trade objectives can be judged by their 
impact on domestic production and international trade flows (Hooker & Caswell, 1999; Runge, 1999; 
Latacz-Lohmann, 2000). Problems arise when domestic policies promote non-commodity outputs 
which are jointly produced with agricultural commodity outputs. Such policies cannot, by their very 
nature, be trade-neutral. Edwards and Fraser (2001) propose that agri-environmental policy be 
evaluated on the basis of social benefit cost analysis and not on effects on production or trade 
volumes. They argue that any market or trade consequences of efficient, welfare-enhancing agri-
environmental policies should not be considered trade-distorting. Such policies are considered “trade-
correcting” by Latacz-Lohmann and Hodge (2001) because they efficiently internalise an externality, 
thereby correcting for a previously existing market failure. In practice, however, few agri-
environmental policies are efficient. Policies may be poorly designed because of information 
deficiencies or asymmetries, or they may be strategically distorted by governments seeking to support 
farmers’ incomes through a “green box” instrument. The focus of this paper is on the latter aspect: we 
investigate optimal environmental policy responses to tariff reduction requirements and assess the 
impact of such policies on the welfare of trading partners. Several authors have shown that large 
countries have strategic incentives to institute environmental policies that deviate from the Pigouvian 
tax or subsidy, because they can take advantage of their monopolistic price leverage in the world 
market (Vandendorpe, 1972; Markusen, 1975; Krutilla, 1991; Rauscher, 1994 and Peterson et. al, 
2002).
1 We extend previous studies by allowing for preferential political weights to be attributed to 
farmers’ welfare. The analysis thus captures equity considerations which have featured in many recent 
contributions to the literature on agricultural policy analysis (e.g. Bullock and Salhofer, 2003; 
Gardner, 1983, 1995; Paarlberg and Abbot, 1986; Abbot and Kallio, 1996). We demonstrate that 
countries which treat farmers’ welfare preferentially have an incentive to implement ‘distorted’ 
environmental policies – even if production is not de facto linked to environmental externalities. We 
then move on to assess the effects of such policy responses on domestic and global welfare. The 
welfare effects of trade liberalisation and strategic environmental policy have so far only been studied 
  2by Burguet and Sempere (2003). This was within a framework of oligopolistic markets and was based 
on the restrictive assumption of constant marginal production costs. We extend Burguet and 
Sempere’s analysis by considering competitive (rather than oligopolistic) markets, allowing for non-
constant marginal production costs, and, most importantly, by including political weights on farmer 
income. We argue that this extension better reflects the characteristics of agricultural markets and agri-
environmental policy. We clarify the conditions under which trading partners do not gain from 
unilateral trade liberalisation if trade concessions are accompanied by strategic environmental policy 
changes and derive conclusions for the WTO process.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 sets out the model. In section 3 we 
derive optimal environmental policy responses to trade liberalisation, i.e. environmental policy choices 
that maximise an individual country’s welfare. We then assess the impact on other nations’ welfare of 
unilateral tariff reductions, when these are accompanied by strategic changes in environmental policy. 
We first study the welfare economics of marginal trade policy changes (section 4), before considering 
the abolishment of tariffs (section 5). Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. The model  
We choose a partial equilibrium trade model to analyze the welfare effects of trade-distorting agri-
environmental policies. The model consists of two large countries trading in a single homogeneous 
agricultural good. The advantage of the bipolar trade model is that global welfare effects can be 
assessed easily, on the assumption that the second country (Country 2) represents the ‘rest the world’. 
The home country (Country 1) produces quantity   at cost  1 S ( ) 1 1 S C . Agricultural production in Country 
1 generates an environmental externality. The monetary value of that externality is denoted ( ) 1 1 S E . The 
sign of ( () 1 1 1 S S E ∂ ∂ ) is positive if the positive effects of agricultural production (e.g. provision of 
landscape amenities or biodiversity) outweigh the detrimental impacts (e.g. pollution, soil erosion), but 
is negative otherwise. We assume the utility from marginal environmental improvements to be 




2 < ∂ ∂ S E . We further assume that the externality is confined to Country 1 and does not spill over 
across national boundaries.  
The agricultural good is also produced in the rest of the world (Country 2). However, in the 
interest of simplicity, we assume that production in Country 2 is environmentally neutral. Country 1 
can fix a tariff (T) or offer an export subsidy (-T), introduce an environmental tax (t) or subsidy (-t) 
linked to production, or use a combination of the two. As discussed above, we assume that policy 
changes occur only in Country 1. Hence, neither tax nor tariff instruments are available to Country 2.  
The home country’s supply   and demand   are defined as functions of domestic 
supply and demand prices, respectively, whereas Country 2’s supply   and demand   are 
determined by the world price. We assume supply and demand curves to be well-behaved and non-
concave. Hence, 
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1 ≥ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ w D P D P D . Building upon these relationships, social welfare functions are defined for 
the home country and for the rest of the world. Country 1’s welfare (W ) comprises consumer surplus, 
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Distributional goals of agricultural policy are accounted for in expression (1) by means of a 
differential political weight (λ ) attached to agricultural producers’ benefits. The welfare function thus 
captures equity considerations which have featured in many recent contributions to the literature on 
agricultural policy analysis (e.g. Bullock and Salhofer 2003). For Country 2, we choose a simplified 
social welfare function (W ), defined as the sum of consumer surplus and producer benefit: 2
 3 
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Trade equilibrium requires excess demand in Country 1 to equal excess supply in Country 2: 
 
() ( ) () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) T t P D T t P S T t P S T t P D w w s D , , , , 2 2 1 1 1 1 − = −         ( 3 )  
 
Transportation and transaction costs are neglected in the interest of simplicity. The margin between 
the home country’s demand price  and the world price   is thus determined solely by the tariff 
rate. The differential between domestic supply ( ) and demand prices is determined by the 
environmental tax rate. The model is completed by the assumption of perfect competition, implying 
that supply prices equal marginal production costs both at home and abroad: 
1 D P w P
1 S P
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3. Optimal environmental policy response to trade liberalisation  
In the following exposition, we assume that Country 1 is a net importer. We begin by formally 
deriving the set of trade and environmental policies that maximises Country 1’s welfare in the absence 
of international trade agreements. We term this set the “first-best policy set” because it is derived 
under the assumption that Country 1 can make simultaneous use of the tax/subsidy and the tariff 
instruments in maximizing domestic welfare. It will serve as benchmark for assessing the welfare 
effects of trade liberalisation and strategic environmental policies.  
The first-order condition for an interior maximum is obtained by taking the partial derivatives of 
the domestic welfare function W  with respect to the tax and tariff rates, setting these equal to zero and 
solving simultaneously (
1
0 1 1 = ∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ T W W t ). Taking this rule and applying the constraints in 
equations (3) and (4) to simplify the result, we obtain:
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where 
1 1 1 1 D S P D P S ∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂ = α , w w P D P S ∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂ = 2 2 β  and  1 1 1 D S X − = . 
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Equations (7) and (8) constitute the first-best policy set. Equation (8) shows that the first-best tariff 
* * T  
is identical to Bhagwati and Ramaswami’s (1963) optimal tariff of international trade theory. The 
optimal tariff is determined by Country 1’s trade flow ( ) and the price responsiveness of foreign  1 X
  4demand and supply (β ). As Country 1 is, by assumption, a net importer ( 0 1 < X ), its optimum tariff 
will be positive (T ), and it will increase with the country’s influence on the terms of trade.   0 >
* *
()
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The first-best environmental policy (equation 7) is the Pigouvian tax/subsidy rate ( 1 1 S E ∂ ∂ − ) if 
farmers’ benefits are attributed the same political weight as those of consumers and taxpayers ( 1 = λ ). 
However, if policy design is influenced by equity considerations ( 1 ≠ λ ), the environmental tax 
deviates from the Pigouvian solution. Note that, by contrast, the tariff is not affected by either the 
environmental externality or by political weights.  
Having established this benchmark, we now turn to the question of how the optimal 
environmental policy changes if Country 1 faces tariff reduction requirements. With a given tariff rate 
being imposed exogenously, the home country can only vary its environmental tax rate to maximise its 
welfare. The second-best environmental tax/subsidy schedule, ( ) T
* t  denoted by one asterisk in the 
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It is obvious from equation (9) that the second-best environmental policy deviates from the first-best 
solution in (7). However, because equations (7) and (9) are evaluated at different points, a direct 
comparison of first-best and second-best policies is difficult. We thus pursue a different route by 
analyzing how marginal changes of the optimum tariff rate affect optimal environmental policy 


























































































T t    (10) 
 
Since  0 > ∂T ∂β , equation (10) assumes a positive value for  1 ≤ λ  and  1 X , otherwise the sign is 
ambiguous. This suggests that a large importing country which attributes a low weight to farmers’ 
income ( 1 ≤ λ ) has an incentive to reduce (increase) the environmental tax (subsidy) rate as it commits 
to tariff reductions. Conversely, if farmer income receives preferential treatment by policy makers 
( 1 > λ ), as is the case in most developed countries, there might be an incentive for those countries to 
tighten their environmental standards by increasing (lowering) the environmental tax (subsidy) rate as 
they commit to tariff reductions. This seems paradoxical, given that farmers would generally benefit 
from low (high) environmental taxes (subsidies). However, it is important to note that equation (10) 
considers the relative change of t. Equation (9) indicates that the absolute value of the environmental 
tax (subsidy) rate will be generally lower (higher) the higher the political weight attached to farmer 
income. Notice also from expression (9) that, even if production is not linked to environmental 
externalities (∂ ), a large country facing tariff reduction requirements may still introduce a 
production tax or subsidy which it may choose to label ‘environmental’, even if there are de facto no 
environmental externalities.  
E
 
4. Welfare effects of marginal trade policy changes  
Having established optimal environmental policy responses to tariff reductions, we now turn to the 
question of how trade liberalisation affects welfare in the ‘rest of the world’ if Country 1 offers tariff 
concessions while simultaneously adjusting its environmental policy. We begin by considering 
marginal trade policy changes before moving on, in the next section, to a consideration of full trade 
liberalisation involving abolishment of tariffs.  
A welfare improvement in the rest of the world (Country 2) as a result of unilateral trade 
liberalisation requires the marginal welfare change induced by a tariff increase to be negative 
( ( ) ,
* * * *
2 dT T t dW ), given that Country 1 is a net importer ( 0 1 < X ) and operates a positive tariff 
(T ). Taking the total differential of Country 2’s welfare function, we obtain:  0
* * >
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Since the first-order condition for a domestically optimal environmental policy will be maintained as 












  .                  (12) 
 
Taking the total differential of both sides of equation (12), we obtain:  
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Substituting (13) into (11) yields: 
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The partial derivatives of W  with respect to t and T can be obtained from equation (2), given the 
constraints in equations (3) and (4): 
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β β α ϕ . 
We assume supply and demand curves to be well-behaved and convex, hence  0 < ∂t ∂β . This 
given, equation (17) assumes a negative value for any  0 1 < X  and  1 ≤ λ , but the sign of (17) is 
ambiguous for any  1 > λ . This formally proves the proposition that trading partners will 
unambiguously gain from unilateral trade concessions if and only if the country offering these 
concessions does not attach a higher weight to the welfare of domestic producers than to that of groups 
in society. This finding holds even if the country acts strategically in setting its domestic policies 
  6following trade liberalisation. If however farmers’ welfare does attract a preferential weight ( 1 > λ ), 
as is the case in most developed countries, trade concessions do not necessarily enhance the welfare of 
trading partners if these concessions are accompanied by strategic environmental policy changes. 
* *
 
5. Welfare effects of full trade liberalisation  
We now turn to assess the welfare effects of discrete (rather than marginal) trade policy changes. 
How does the abolishment of tariff policy in Country 1 affect the rest of the world’s welfare? We 
begin by assuming that Country 1 faced no trade policy restrictions and acted strategically in setting its 
trade and environmental policies. Consequently, it would have chosen the domestically optimal policy 
set (T ,t ) derived in section 3, resulting in Country 2’s welfare 
* * * * ( )
* * * *
2
* * * *
2 ,T t W = W
− . After a tariff ban 
(T ), Country 1 has an incentive to adjust its environmental tax/subsidy rate to  0 =
o ( )
o T
* t , leaving 
Country 2 with welfare  ( ) ( )





− W . The welfare implications for Country 2’s can thus be 
written as:  
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For solving the integrals in (18) we need to specify the functional form of supply, demand and 
environmental externality relationships. For mathematical convenience, we choose linear demand and 
supply functions. We further assume a constant relationship between marginal environmental quality 
and domestic supply changes.
 6 Making selective substitutions of expressions (15) and (16), expression 
(18) can be rearranged as: 
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Given the linearity assumption for demand and supply functions, we can write 
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Making use of equations (3), (4), (20), (21) and the mathematical expressions for T , 
o T , 
( )
o T t
*  and t , we can derive:  
* *
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Substituting (22) and (23) into equation (19) yields: 
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Expression (24) shows that the difference in Country 2’s welfare following a tariff ban in Country 
1,  , is unambiguously positive if 




− − −W W
o 1 ≤ λ . Thus, provided that no preferential weights are 
attributed to farmers’ welfare, a tariff ban will unambiguously enhance trading partners’ welfare, even 
if a country acts strategically in setting its domestic policies in following trade liberalisation. We have 
thus formally proven that, given  1 ≤ λ , an optimal tariff policy is generally more trade distorting than 
strategically distorted environmental policies. This is plausible because social welfare gains for one 
country, through terms of trade improvements, are generally achieved at the expense of welfare losses 
for the rest of the world. Such terms of trade improvements are maximised by an optimal tariff.  
The more interesting finding, however, is that the direction of welfare change in Country 2 
following a tariff ban by Country 1 is generally ambiguous if Country 1 attaches preferential political 
weights to farmers’ welfare. This is in accordance with the findings in the previous section which 
considered marginal tariff reductions. We can thus conclude with confidence that trade concessions on 
highly protected agricultural markets in large industrial countries do not necessarily enhance the 
welfare of trading partners if these countries are free to distort their environmental policies. This 
conclusion holds under the proviso that the country opening up to trade had previously operated an 
optimal tariff as per equation (8), which may or may not be a true reflection of reality.  
 
6. Conclusions 
We have derived optimal environmental policy choices in response to tariff reduction requirements 
and have assessed the impact of such policies on the welfare of trading partners. The analysis was 
based on a partial-equilibrium trade model which allowed for differential political weights to be 
attributed to farmers’ welfare. The study was motivated by the ongoing debate about the 
multifunctional role of agriculture and fears expressed in that debate that countries might use 
multifunctionality as a pretext for introducing trade-distorting agri-environmental policies as a 
substitute for conventional border protection.  
Our analysis suggests that such allegations may be justified to the extent that countries which 
attribute preferential political weights to farmers’ welfare have an incentive to implement tax or 
subsidy schedules that substantially deviate from the Pigouvian solution. Environmental tax (subsidy) 
rates will be generally lower (higher) the higher the political weight attached to farmer income. More 
importantly, the incentive to implement such policies exists even if production is not de facto linked to 
environmental externalities. Finally, we have proven that trading partners will unambiguously gain 
from unilateral trade concessions if and only if the country offering these concessions does not attach a 
higher weight to the welfare of domestic producers than to that of other groups in society. If, by 
contrast, the country offering trade concessions treats farmers’ welfare preferentially, as is the case in 
many developed countries, trade liberalisation does not necessarily enhance the welfare of trading 
partners if these concessions are accompanied by strategic environmental policy changes. These 
findings do not conflict with Edwards and Fraser’s (2001) proposition that any market or trade 
consequences of efficient, welfare-enhancing agri-environmental policies should not be considered 
trade-distorting. We argue that such ideal policies are unlikely to be forthcoming in practice. Countries 
  8opening up to free trade have an incentive to institute distorted policies, which are not necessarily 
welfare-enhancing.  
Two policy conclusions flow from these findings. First, if a country does not necessarily gain 
from tariff concessions offered by another country which is free to adjust its domestic environmental 
policies, the country should only negotiate package deals, i.e. tariff reductions combined with 
environmental policy commitments. One may postulate a role for the WTO to oversee the process of 
domestic policy formulation to ensure that the gains from trade liberalisation are not impaired by 
strategically motivated adjustments to domestic policies. This postulate is reinforced by the second 
conclusion: Given the incentive to implement domestic policies even if there are de facto no 
externalities, it seems important that the WTO establishes guidelines for distinguishing genuine policy 
from disguised protectionism. This may not be an easy task given that the level of demand for 
environmental, and particularly multifunctional, benefits is difficult to measure. Latacz-Lohmann and 
Hodge (2001) suggest that the level of activity (membership, budget, etc.) of non-government 
organizations may provide evidence of legitimate concern for some issues. Non-market valuation may 
also have a role to play in this process, although it cannot be sufficiently reliable and encompassing to 
offer the sole basis for judgement. Furthermore, domestic policies should have clearly defined 
objectives and should be targeted to achieve the stated objectives. However, even an optimally 
designed and targeted policy may, by virtue of ‘joint production’ be seen to have ‘adverse’ trade 
impacts. We argue that Green Box is the appropriate place in which to locate efficient agri-
environmental policies – even if they appear to subsidise trade. There is no rationale for including 
payments to farmers through efficient agri-environmental policy in the calculation of a country’s 
AMS. Green Box boundaries must be extended accordingly to allow policies – those meeting fairly 
rigid criteria, we emphasise – that enhance the multifunctional role of agriculture.  
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  10Endnotes  
 
1 Kennedy (1994), Conrad (1993), Markusen et al. (1993), Barrett (1994), Ulph (1996), Greaker 
(2003) and others extended Markusen’s and Krutilla’s analyses by analyzing strategically optimal 
environmental policies within a game theoretic framework.  
 
2 We define the ‘producer benefit’ as the difference between total revenues and total costs, which 
differs from ‘producer surplus’ measuring the difference between total revenues and variable costs. 
 
3  w P denotes the equilibrium world price. 
 
4 For deriving equation (5) and (6) we make use of the requirements  t X t X ∂ ∂ − = ∂ ∂ 2 1  and 
T X T X ∂ ∂ − = ∂ ∂ 2 1 , which can be obtained from equation (3). 
 
5 See Appendix for the second-order conditions of an interior maximum. 
 
6 Although linear demand functions are more likely to be convex than linear, they have been used in 
theoretical studies by, among many others, Rhode and Stegeman (2000), Tanaka (2001), Rath and 
Zhao (2001) and Gonzalez-Maestre and Lopez-Cunat (2001). 
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